view widely held among both courts and commentators. 5 This article will indicate possible shortcomings to the Mishkin approach in terms of utility, equality of treatment, consistency with prior decisions, and congruence with the current functions and operation of habeas corpus. It will argue that all newly declared constitutional rights should be given retroactive effect, because (1) the norms now being given federal constitutional sanction are not newly relevant, but rather so basic to our kind of constitutional democracy that convictions violative of them cannot be allowed to stand; and (2) the disadvantages of complete retroactivity have been greatly exaggerated.
I. THE MISHKIN APPROACH
In Part I of his article, Professor Mishkin urges that for institutional, symbolic, and functional reasons, judicial decisions should almost always be accorded retroactive effect. Institutionally, courts exist to resolve past disputes, and adjudication thus inherently points retrospectively. Symbolically, and probably most importantly, much of the power and prestige of courts depends on the attribution of impartial impersonality to judges, who, under the Blackstonian conception, do not create but only declare "fixed overriding law"; 6 although this symbol of impartial and impersonal fidelity to preexisting law is often far from reality, abandoning it in favor of a general power of nonretroactive overruling would put the courts in the highly undesirable and politically vulnerable posture of overt legislators. Functionally, because retroactivity produces particularly strong reactions from those affected, judicial awareness that innovating decisions will have to be given retroactive effect may make for greater restraint.
Because of his general preference for retroactivity, Professor Mishkin deplores the fact that in Linkletter v. Walker 7 the Supreme Court based its holding (that Mapp is not available on habeas corpus to convictions which became final before the date of decision) on a "general power-and hence duty-to decide 'in each case' whether a rule should be given retroactive effect." 8 The claim of such a general power is at war with the above-stated values, for it openly proclaims the legislative powers of the Court. Even on its own terms, Professor Mishkin further argues, the Linkletter decision was unwarranted. Although the Court noted that state officials had relied upon Wolf v. Colorado, 9 such reliance was unjustified since Wolf had made it clear that at least the "core" of the fourth amendment was applicable to the states. Moreover, why should the benefit of retroactivity be given to Mrs. Mapp but not to Linidetter? The stated purposes of Mapp-deterrence of unconstitutional invasions of privacy and attainment of a more harmonious state-federal relationship-are furthered no more by retroactivity for Mrs. Mapp than for Linkletter, for in both cases "reparation comes too late.2 1 0
For reasons he sets forth in Part III, however, Professor Mishkin concludes that both Mapp and Linkletter are not only right but also consistent with each other. Mrs. Mapp's case came up on direct review, and, in accordance with the normal preference for retroactivity, she received the benefit of the ruling, even if its rationale pointed prospectively. Linldetter's case, on the other hand, came up collaterally, on habeas corpus, and here:
The doctrine that a final judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in the rule is long established, and though that doctrine is perhaps more firmly settled in the context of civil litigation, the underlying considerations of finality find significant parallels in the criminal field. From this aspect, the Linkletter problem becomes not so much one of prospectivity or retroactivity of the rule but rather of the availability of collateral attack -in this case federal habeas corpus-to go behind the otherwise final judgment of conviction.:" For Professor Mishkin, collateral relief is extraordinary relief, justified in only two situations. The first he explains as follows:
[R]ecognition of . . . [constitutional defects in the procedure used to convict] serves to free prisoners as to whom there is greater doubt than the Constitution allows that they have in fact done the acts which constitute the crime for which they are being punished.
[When a constitutional guarantee is heightened or added to in a manner calculated to improve the reliability of a finding of guilt, the new interpretation essentially establishes a new required level of confidence as the condition for criminal punishment.
Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do, earlier proceedings whose reliability does not measure up to current constitutional standards for determining guilt may well be considered inadequate justification for continued detention . . . . On this basis, habeas corpus would assess the validity of a conviction, no matter how long past, by any current constitutional standards which have an intended effect of enhancing the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 12 The second function of habeas corpus is to provide a substitute in the federal district courts for the unavoidably rare direct Supreme Court review of state decisions to enforce federal standards of dignity, integrity, and reliability. Insofar as the "intended effects" of a particular newly enunciated constitutional right are limited to furthering dignity and integrity and not reliability, Professor Mishkin contends, there is no reason to apply, on habeas corpus, standards that would not have been applied on direct review; upsetting old convictions cannot further these values.
Applying this analysis to specific cases, it is clear that Mapp did not improve the reliability of the process, whereas Gideon v. Wainwright,13 Griffin v. Illinois, 14 Griffin v. California, 15 and Malloy v.
Hogan' 6 did. Coerced confessions likewise involve reliability, for coercion impairs, among other things, trustworthiness. Escobedo v. Illinois, 17 however, "does not seem principally aimed at improving the trustworthiness of suspects' statements; protection of personal dignity and integrity, within the framework of an adversary system, seems a far more satisfactory rationale."' 8
The foregoing is Professor Mishkin's theory as I understand it. No summary, however, can do justice to the numerous subtle insights, or to the painstaking, balanced, and lucid comprehensiveness of his analysis. Nevertheless, with all deference, I think this approach contains too many difficulties to be workable and is fundamentally wrong.
II. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE MISHKIN APPROACH
The Inconsistency Between Parts I and III As previously mentioned, one of Professor Mishkin's major arguments against nonretroactive overruling is that it puts the Court into an overt legislative posture, thus exposing it to numerous political and doctrinal strains. But his own approach exposes the Court to precisely the same strains. Under his theory, the Court will have to make at least as many explicit and controversial decisions in respect to retroactivity as are necessary-and to him, deplorable-under a "general prospectivity power" theory. This is because every facet of every right "absorbed" into the fourteenth amendment will be raised on habeas corpus by some prisoner somewhere as soon as it is declared, and the Court will then have to make an overt, explicit choice between retroactivity and nonretroactivity. The fact that the issue arises on collateral attack some time after the right is first declared will not reduce the number of necessary choices, nor will the particular criterion by which retroactivity will be determined: once it is decided that only some rulings will be given retroactive effect, choices must openly be made, and it is the open display of change and of choice which exposes the legislative powers of the Court.
Indeed, where collateral attack is concerned, Professor Mishkin seems to swing almost completely away from his earlier preference for retroactivity, and to set up instead a presumption against retroactivity. Professor Mishkin proposes, as did the Court in Linkletter, that on collateral attack new standards not be applied to old convictions unless good cause is shown, i.e., unless reliability is involved. 19 Thus, despite his earlier concern and criticism, he ends by putting the Court in the same undesirable legislative posture as he found and criticized in Linkletter. 
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This alleged inconsistency will be of little concern to those who do not accept Professor Mishkin's symbolism rationale for preferring retroactivity. In addition, two aspects of the Mishkin approach might minimize the strains resulting from the exercise of a power of selective retroactivity: (1) making criminal due process decisions retroactive probably excites greater public hostility than does making them prospective; 2 1 (2) choosing between retroactivity and prospectivity by reference to whether a danger exists that innocent people were convicted by the use of unreliable evidence will probably excite relatively little public hostility. 22 On the other hand, a theory which is hard to apply yet which must be applied frequently in controversial situations can often produce more dissatisfaction than one which, though initially less popular, is easier to apply. Apart from the unpopularity aspect-which, after all, cannot be given decisive weight-a theory of selective retroactivity raises the specter of continuous controversy over the soundness of its application.
Shortcomings of the Reliability Test
The reliability test's uncertainty, necessity for frequent application, and inadequacy for explaining recent decisions can best be seen by examining Professor Mishkin's analyses of three specific rights relating to the interrogation process: (1) the newly declared standards for determining when a confession is coerced, to which retroactive effect has apparently been given; 23 (2) the privilege against self-incrimination with its no-comment corollary, to which retroactivity has just been convictions still in the process of direct review); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230-32 (1964) (noting that the rule of abatement applies to any proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it, including the United States Supreme Court). See "saving clause" discussions in Hamm, 379 U.S. at 314, 319-20, and Bell, 378 U.S. at 232-37. Moreover, because a greater volume of cases will arise on collateral attack than are still on direct review, prospectivity will be invoked much more often than retroactivity. 21 It should be noted, however, that Professor Mishkin's general preference for retroactivity is based on a contrary hypothesis. 22 Even strongly prosecution-oriented critics purport to condemn police practices that raise doubts as to reliability. 
Coerced Confessions
Professor Mishkin first notes that the Court "has made perfectly clear that the exclusion of [coerced] confessions does not depend upon any explicit finding or even any specific likelihood that the confession is unreliable." 2 6 Coercion does, however, produce a "significant risk" of unreliability, and "the constitutional rules may still have an intended effect upon the reliability of the guilt-determining process." 27 To meet the contention that the risk of unreliability under prior authority is so negligible as not to be a significant basis for the more recent confession rules, Professor Mishkin states: "It is in my judgment a complete answer... that the Supreme Court has ... continued consistently to develop its rationale in terms of 'coercion,' 'involuntariness,' and 'overbearing of the will' of the defendant. It seems appropriate to take the Court at its word.
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Professor Mishkin's argument thus comes down to a reliance on the Court's continuing use of the "voluntariness" terminology. But if we are "to take the Court at its word," should we not take it at those words which fit the facts of the recent cases, rather than rely on a label like "voluntariness," which, as Professor Lawrence Herman has said, "hides the values now underlying the confession rules"? 2 
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The University of Chicago Law Review regard to its reliability," 33 and in Malloy v. Hogan, the Court made it clear that, as Professor Paulsen has said, "the true basis for excluding a coerced confession is not the danger of a false confession but the need to protect the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination." 34 Protecting the privilege against self-incrimination is, as will be shown below, frequently more likely to impair rather than to foster reliability. Thus, if we really take the Court at its word, it becomes virtually impossible to base the retroactivity of the coerced confession cases on a realistic concern for reliability. Professor Mishkin's view of the confession cases does find some modest support in Mr. Justice Clark's .attempt in Linkletter to distinguish coerced confession from search and seizure cases. Mr. Justice Clark first denied that retroactivity was at issue at all in the confession cases: "[T]he principle that a coerced confession is not admissible in a trial predated the arrest as well as the original conviction in each of [Reck v . that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.') There is, however, a real danger of partial unreliability. See Herman, supra note 29, at 454 n.25. Indeed, one interrogator has confided to me that he sometimes wonders how any confession stands up because though confessions are basically accurate, the transcription process and the frequent absence of a stenographer, which necessitates direct and laborious typewriter transcription by a policeman, make for numerous inaccuracies in detail. Weakness of memory and the tensions of the moment would also seem to preclude total accuracy. The Court, however, has rarely mentioned such problems, and this kind of partial inaccuracy, which would rarely raise significant doubts as to guilt, would hardly be enough to justify the now extensive "voluntariness" limits on interrogational techniques. 40 is, to say the least, quite substantial, 41 and the fact that "coerced" confessions have always been excluded seems relatively unimportant. The second point as to the importance of reliability would seem to support Professor Mishkin's position but for the fact that it is not clear from the opinion whether reliability is an indispensable element for retroactivity, or whether society's abhorrence to such a practice is an independently sufficient ground for retroactivity. 42 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Clark's citation of Jackson v. Denno for the proposition that reliance is the basis for retroactivity in the confession cases seems inappropriate. Rather than dealing with the content of the voluntariness standard, Jackson dealt with the choice of persons constitutionally empowered to determine voluntariness-a quite different problem. And since Jackson affected only some seventeen jurisdictions, 43 it is difficult to see how it can be used to justify retroactivity for confession cases in all jurisdictions, including those which prior to Jackson had constitutionally correct procedures for determining voluntariness. 44 
Self-Incrimination
The coerced confession cases indicate the inability of the reliability rationale to explain Supreme Court decisions in one area of retro-activity problems; the self-incrimination cases, on the other hand, demonstrate the uncertainties and difficulties of application of the reliability approach. In addition, the facts of one self-incrimination case, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 45 dramatically illustrate the artificiality of Professor Mishkin's and the Court's sharp distinction between direct and collateral attack.
In Griffin v. California 4 6 the Court held that neither prosecutors nor judges could draw adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to take the stand. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion noted that comment on an accused's failure to testify penalizes exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that taking the stand will often "confuse and embarrass . . . [a defendant] to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him." 47 While recognizing that reliability "is clearly not the most generally accepted" explanation of the privilege, 48 Professor Mishkin interprets the Court's language about the defendant's confusion and embarrassment as implying that improper denials or curtailments of the privilege against self-incrimination affect the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 49 This January in Tehan five members of the Court seemed to accept Professor Mishkin's overall reliability rationale, but, arguing that the "privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," 50 they denied retroactive effect to Griffin, and by implication to Malloy. This inability of Professor Mishkin and the Court to agree upon the proper outcome of an application of the reliability tesC is but one reflection of the test's inherent uncertainties.
As to the merits, the Court's decision seems correct with respect to the reliability implications of the privilege against self-incrimination in general, but Professor Mishkin's approach seems correct with respect to the reliability implications of comment. It seems strained to argue that the privilege against self-incrimination in general is aimed at ensuring reliability. Rather, as Professor Mishkin candidly concedes, the Court has stressed the role of the privilege in protecting the accusatorial system, a system which, by concealing information, frequently 45 382 U.S. 406 (1966 
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Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process impairs. the reliability of the guilt-determining process. 51 Indeed, even more so than coerced confessions, evidence obtained from the mouth or files of a defendant is likely to be reliable, and though concern about coercive abuses may still be one of the values underlying the privilege, 52 the privilege surely plays a very small role today in preventing such abuses.
In support of his position, Professor Mishkin points to the embarrassment and consequent prejudice which defendants may suffer when they take the stand. That this prejudice usually produces unreliable inferences of guilt is dubious, despite Mr. Justice Douglas' assertions in Griffin. Moreover, a defendant who stays off the stand faces at least as much prejudice-so much so, in fact, that probably only the fear of even greater prejudice from the exposure of a criminal record is sufficient to persuade defendants to claim the privilege. On balance, then, it seems likely that the privilege against self-incrimination reduces rather than enhances reliability.
53
On the other hand, adverse comment on the exercise of the privilege not only penalizes that exercise, but also fosters the drawing of possibly erroneous inferences. Though a jury might draw such inferences in the (1951) . But the likelihood of such perjury will be considered by the jury, and the defendant's testimony discounted. On the other hand, as the text indicates, allowing the defendant to stay off the stand enables the jury to draw theoretically unwarranted inferences about the defendant's guilt. It is therefore hard to see which will breed more ultimate unreliability-the danger of such discounted perjury or the danger of improper inferences from a defendant's exercise of his privilege, which inferences probably cannot be dispelled despite instructions to the contrary. absence of any adverse comments, its action would not otherwise be "judicially solemnified." Indeed, the Griffin Court expressly mentioned the danger of erroneous inferences as one of the reasons for its decision. 54 Thus, Professor Mishkin seems correct with respect to this facet of the privilege.
If sound, this analysis of the Griffin-Tehan problem indicates a basic shortcoming of the reliability rationale: its effect of requiring the Court to make difficult and controversial retroactivity analyses not only with respect to each individual constitutional right, but also for each facet and application of such rights. Although difficult and controversial decisions are hardly a novel experience for the Court, a theory which greatly multiplies the necessary occasions for such decisions is not one deliberately to be sought. Indeed, a desire to avoid the necessity of a multiplicity of analyses may well have been one reason why the Court in Tehan dealt with the comment privilege as a mere corollary of the privilege against self-incrimination in general, without considering the obvious special features of the comment privilege which were expressly relied upon in Griffin.
Tehan illustrates a problem with respect to another major premise of Professor Mishkin's approach: his assertion that there is a sharp difference in function between direct review and habeas corpus, an assertion which he uses to reconcile Mapp and Linkletter. 55 In Tehan, as in Linkletter, the Court seemed to adopt a similar dividing line, for it held that the new rules it was announcing would be applied to cases "still pending on direct review," and thus not "final," at the time the decision was announced. Cases deemed "final" were those in which "the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied, all before [the relevant date of decision]." 5 54 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) . Such an inference is dearly unfair if an innocent defendant with a criminal record refrains from taking the stand for fear that his testimony as to present innocence--which will inevitably be discounted for selfinterest-will be outweighed by the evidence of his prior record. Where federal review of the constitutionality of state criminal proceedings is concerned, the making of so sharp a distinction between review on certiorari and habeas corpus is unwarranted. There is often no significant difference with respect to age and potential staleness between the two types of cases. Rather than coming years after the conviction is final, habeas corpus is often but a routine step in the criminal defense process-the normal step taken after certiorari has been denied. 57 Sometimes, it actually replaces certiorari, for in Fay v. Noia 58 the Supreme Court advised criminal defendants to skip certiorari and to petition directly to the federal district court for habeas corpus. 5 9 Even in situations in which a defendant goes through all the direct review steps, it is often nothing more than fortuitous circumstance 60 which determines whether his case is still on direct review or is on collateral attack when the new decision comfes down.
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The difference between review on certiorari and habeas corpus seems ,even less significant when we look to function and actual operation. Although it is sometimes considered the "normal" method for obtaining federal review of state convictions, certiorari does not provide, as the Court remarked in Fay v. Noia, "a normal appellate channel in any sense comparable to the writ of error," 62 for the Court must limit its jurisdiction to questions that have significance beyond the immediate case. Habeas corpus, on the other hand, facilitates the Court's task in those cases it does take by providing a record focused exclusively on the federal constitutional question. 63 Habeas corpus has 57 MFADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND CARTA 71 (1966) . Even with respect to those cases not still in litigation when the new decision comes down, the time differences are often negligible. Thus, although Linkletter was not actively pursuing his collateral remedies on June 19, 1961, and had not sought certiorari, a comparison of his case with Mapp shows how insignificant the danger of staleness becomes even where the defendant has ceased to pursue his remedies. As noted above, Linkletter's offense was actually committed at a later date than Mapp's; final review was roughly contemporaneous; and he petitioned for post-conviction relief "immediately" after Mapp was decided. 381 U.S. at 621, 641. Had relief been granted, a hearing on the illegality of the search and a possible retrial would have taken place at about the same time as any similar proceedings in Mapp.
68 372 U.S. 391 (1963) . 59 Id. at 437-38. 60 These fortuities can include litigation timing, court congestion, and the Supreme Court's choice of when to announce a new rule.
61 In Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965), a capital case, defendant's time for certiorari ran out a few days before Escobedo was decided. Id. at 118, 213 A.2d at 671. Had the defendant filed a petition for certiorari-probably a futile gesture at that time-he would have been entitled to consideration under Escobedo. In Linkletter, the offense actually took place after Mrs. Mapp's alleged offense, with "final" review roughly contemporaneous. 381 U.S. at 641. Here, too, the defendant decided not to file a probably useless petition for certiorari. See Tehan, a particularly difficult case, discussed in the text accompanying note 69 infra.
62 372 U.S. at 436. 65 The habeas corpus court can take testimony and make independent findings of fact, whereas on direct review the Supreme Court supposedly cannot. But as a practical matter, the Supreme Court has done its own fact-finding in many direct review cases, see Bator, supra note 2, at 514-21; Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 CoLUmr. L. REv. 943, 946 n.18 (1965); cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963), and if a full and fair state court hearing has been held under the standards of Townsend v. Sain, the habeas corpus court will neither review the facts too closely nor take new evidence. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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66 In theory, existence of an adequate and independent state procedural ground precludes direct review but has no effect on habeas corpus. But the Court's treatment of the adequate and independent state procedural ground doctrine in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) Noia. If a defendant has doubts about the retroactivity of any claim which might both affect him and be subject to Court review in the foreseeable future, he will be well advised always to ignore the Court's suggestion and to apply for certiorari. Many months may pass before his petition for certiorari is rejected, and so long as it is pending, he will be entitled to receive the benefits of any intervening decisions. As soon as he files his petition for habeas corpus, however, even if he does so only a day after the last state court order is entered, he will have forfeited his right to such benefits. He will thus be put to an election between delayed relief and no relief at all. 68 The inequity of drawing a sharp distinction between direct review and habeas corpus is, however, only one aspect of a broader inequity: treating two prisoners deprived of the same fundamental constitutional right differently merely because the Supreme Court did not get around to enunciating a particular right until after the conviction of one of them had become final. Professor Mishkin argues that worry about this point ignores "the reasons for barring current convictions and . . . the fact that the new rule in no way undermines the earlier determinations of factual guilt." 69 To him, it is as if a guilty person were to complain of his lot because others equally guilty were not prosecuted. Can it be said, in any meaningful sense, that even though certiorari had been denied, Shott's conviction was "final" before Griffin was decided? All of these proceedings followed his original conviction in due course, without any delay. And is it not largely fortuitous that Malloy and Griffin-not Tehan-were chosen as the declaring decisions? Though logic may not provide a totally satisfying answer to retroactivity problems, see And though he recognizes that such claims are sometimes sustained, 7 1 he concludes that "there are certainly rational bases for drawing a line between current convictions and those previously final," citing excerpts from Professors Bator and Amsterdam on finality. 72 Professor Mishkin's sharp distinction between collateral attack and direct review thus rests ultimately on finality considerations.
Finality considerations seem especially -weak where two cases differ only in the fact that one is still on "direct" review whereas the other is not. Where the two cases are far apart in age, finality considerations are admittedly more persuasive. But even there, the mere timing of the Court's decision to grant federal protection to a fundamental right hardly seems to be a sufficient basis for unequal treatment; after all, in most instances it was not the older prisoner's fault that the Court did not render its decision earlier. To some extent, of course, the question comes down to a choice between the competing values of equality and repose, and choices of this sort are notoriously immune to reasoned resolution. It will be suggested below, 73 however, that the threat to finality considerations from complete retroactivity appears to have been greatly exaggerated, and if this suggestion is well taken, Professor Mishkin's rejection of equality is especially untenable.
The Right to Counsel-Escobedo v. Illinois
When this article was written, the retroactivity of Escobedo was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court has recently decided the issue against retroactivity, 74 and a discussion of its decision appears in the Epilogue. However, the original comments may still be of value, for they raise some general issues of the administration of a reliability rationale which may recur in future cases dealing with federal and state court doctrines related to Escobedo, 75 The problem was complicated by the uncertainties of the scope and purpose of Escobedo. Possible readings of the case ranged from the one extreme of a mere requirement that the defendant be notified of his rights, to the other of a requirement that a court-appointed lawyer be present from the moment of arrest, if not earlier. These possibilities have been canvassed elsewhere at great length, 76 and, as will be shown in the Epilogue, still have not been resolved. 7 7 Because of these uncertainties, a full analysis of the retroactivity aspects of the case on the basis of a theory which, like Professor Mishkin's, makes retroactivity dependent on the "intended effects" of the decision involved, seemed and still seems somewhat premature.
A further and related complicating factor was the presence of several potentially applicable but conflicting lines of precedent. Insofar as Escobedo is a right to counsel case, Gideon points toward retroactivity; insofar as it is a self-incrimination case, Tehan points toward prospectivity; and insofar as it is a coerced confession case, Reck v. Pate 78 may imply retroactivity. This article focuses on implications only of the coerced confession and right to counsel aspects of the decision.
Though Professor Mishkin believes that coerced confession cases should be applied retroactively, he concludes that Escobedo should not be. He states his position thus:
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Court [in Escobedo] formally rests the decision upon the right to effective assistance of counsel. However, the discussion also brings to bear the policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination as well as the considerations supporting the rule against involuntary confessions. Though these latter doctrines may be regarded as indirectly relevant, indicating some of the ways in which assistance of counsel may help preserve an individual's other constitutional rights, it is possible that they have independent significance in the holding as well. But regardless of the precise relevance of these doctrines to the holding, it is clear that the constitutional objectives of Escobedo lie primarily in the direction of protecting human integrity and dignity rather than of increasing the reliability of the processes for determining guilt. It should be remembered, in this connection, that any confession to the police was already subject to exclusion if found to be involuntary under previous authority, itself quite far-reaching in its protections. Escobedo's added reach thus does not seem principally aimed at improving the trustworthiness of suspects' statements; protection of personal dignity and integrity, within the framework of an adversary system, seems a far more satisfactory rationale 9 It is difficult to understand how Professor Mishkin can so quickly dismiss the coerced confession and privilege aspects of Escobedo. As to the first, the only one to be discussed here, one of the most common explanations of Escobedo-an explanation relied upon by both proponents and opponents of retroactivity 8 -was that the decision was designed primarily to eliminate the possibility of coerced confessions by preventing the creation of coercive environments. A related common explanation was that the case was a reaction to the Court's inability to penetrate the interrogation room to determine whether the confessions before it were indeed voluntary. 8 ' Thus, at least part of Escobedo's protection of "personal dignity and integrity" during the interrogation process was seen as being aimed at the prevention of coercion.
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The recognition of such an aim implies a view that situations which do not comply with Escobedo's requirements are likely to be coercive, and that the absence of impartial witnesses from such situations not On the other hand, the institution of an additional protection against coerced confessions does not logically require the conclusion that all or even most confessions taken without this protection are likely to be coerced. And it does seem somewhat strained to argue that the reliability of confessions taken without a lawyer is as suspect as the reliability of trials conducted without a lawyer. But reliability is not the only or even the main purpose of the coerced confession rule. 85 Other values subsumed under the term "voluntariness" include the deterrence of improper police pressure and the prevention of ignorant, duped, or compelled waivers of the privilege against selfincrimination. The likelihood of violating these values in the interrogation process is far from negligible 8 6-in fact, it is probably greater than the likelihood of obtaining unreliable confessions. 8 7 And whatever the values sought to be protected by the rule against coerced confessions, the Supreme Court must have thought they were receiving extremely inadequate protection prior to Escobedo, for Escobedo is, as the Court itself recognized, 8 
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problem, the Court must have thought that the likelihood of improper pressure in secret interrogations was considerable. Thus, if Professor Mishkin's comment that "pre-Escobedo authority already provided for the exclusion of the vast bulk of confessions having substantial likelihood of being untrustworthy in fact" 9 is meant to be interpreted as saying that pre-Escobedo authority successfully excluded "the vast bulk of confessions having any substantial likelihood" of having been obtained in violation of the other values subsumed under the term "voluntariness," it is clearly a minority view.
Though coerced confession cases loomed large in the background, Escobedo was actually decided under the sixth amendment as a case involving the right to counsel at the early stages of the criminal process. The Court had already decided that the right to counsel at a later stage of that process is to be given retroactive effect, 90 and Professor Mishkin approves of this decision. Thus, his rejection of retroactivity for Escobedo implies a belief that different stages of the criminal process have different right-to-counsel retroactivity aspects, depending, apparently, on the significance of counsel's presence to the guilt-determining and fact-finding functions of the different stages. Surely, this further multiplication of problems 91 --problems so difficult that Professor Mishkin devotes more than one-seventh of his article to Escobedo alone-does not further the goals set forth by him in his Part I and makes his test all the more difficult to apply.
Moreover, is Escobedo so different from Gideon and the other rightto-counsel cases? Although the discussion to this point has focused on Escobedo's importance to coercion and self-incrimination, the opinion's structure and precedents support a broader role for the right to counsel. The opinion can be broken down into two parts. The first sets out an affirmative statement of precedents and policy, 92 while the second replies to arguments that the presence of counsel has unduly harmful effects on interrogation. 93 In its first part, the opinion relies 
Summary
These varied and numerous uncertainties point up a basic shortcoming of Professor Mishkin's thesis that constitutional rights should be given retroactive application only when one of their "intended effects" serves to further reliability. Constitutional rights often further a variety of purposes, 0 9 and a specific situation or problem may raise a variety of constitutional rights. 10 The strands of doctrine and policy in constitutional due process rights are often numerous, tangled, and uncertain in scope, and the significance of any particular strand is often hard to assess."' Yet, Professor Mishkin's approach expressly requires that this extremely difficult task be undertaken with respect to every distinct facet and application of every right, often soon after the right has been declared and before uncertainties have been re-107 This broader notion of the right to counsel is really not altogether novel. It goes back to Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932) , which referred to the need for the guidance of counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings, without indicating any limitation of counsel's function. See Kamisar, Equal justice 56. On the other hand, many lawyers will simply tell their clients to keep silent, and nothing more will be involved.
108 Mishkin 96-99. 109 Consider the range of possible contexts in which the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel may apply. duced. The difficulties and perplexities set forth above will thus be encountered again and again.
Moreover, the courts will face problems in dealing with rights which do not fit easily into the Mishkin dichotomy. Professor Mishkin discusses only procedural due process and not equal protection, and thus a separate analysis may be needed for the latter area. 112 And what of such rights as cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy?" 3 Neither of these rights affects in any significant sense the reliability of the guilt-determining process, but surely we do not want to acquiesce in the continued imposition of a penalty we now consider too cruel or the continued punishment of a person tried twice for the same offense. To cover these and similar rights, then, we will need different analyses. 114 Nor can such distinctions and refinements be limited to the interjurisdictional retroactivity context. Professor Mishkin's analysis is explicitly based not on considerations peculiar to retroactivity in a changing law context, but rather on the function of habeas corpus in assuring procedural due process in all contexts. Thus, it would seem to include intrajurisdictional cases even where old standards are involved. On his view of the function of habeas corpus, Professor Mishkin would always deny relief to intrajurisdictional cases not involving rights affecting reliability, for the alternate purpose of habeas corpus -supervising state application of federal law-would not be relevant." 5 Yet, habeas corpus relief has been granted to federal prisoners raising claims not involving the reliability of the fact-finding process, such as search and seizure, 116 120 The present scope of habeas corpus relief is far from clear, and adoption of the Mishkin approach, which would require a multiplicity of rationales and distinctions, would make this "untidy area of the law' ' 1 21 even more untidy.
To sum up, Professor Mishkin's approach is difficult to apply but requires frequent application; rests on artificially sharp and often inequitable distinctions between collateral attack and direct review; and is too limited in scope to offer adequate explanations of certain areas of constitutional criminal procedure. An approach containing so many defects requires many offsetting benefits indeed.
Finality
The benefits Professor Mishkin finds in his approach all relate to the attainment of finality. Consequently, analysis is required of the force and weight of considerations of finality.
A vigorous argument for finality has been made by Professors Paul Bator and Anthony Amsterdam, both of whom are quoted approvingly and extensively by Professor Mishkin. 1 2 2 In explaining "why...
[we] seek a point at which .. .a judgment becomes final," Professor Bator mentions:
[ He then suggests certain limitations on finality to ensure the preservation of fairness and jurisdictional competence in the corrective process. 24 Professor Bator's four considerations are all obviously important, but his estimate of the damage that easily available federal habeas corpus would cause to them seems exaggerated. First, there is little indication so far that our "intellectual, moral and political resources" have been strained by the increased number of state habeas corpus petitions. 125 Since most petitions are denied out of hand without even a hearing, 126 and since hearings, when held, are usually brief, there would seem to be little real strain on our physical resources. As -to the other kinds of resources, it is difficult to pin down the existence of any such strain. Indeed, it could be argued that continued and frequent consideration of constitutional claims will strengthen our moral and 123 Bator, supra note 117, at 451-53. 
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Second, no one has ever called for indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else. Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is limited to constitutional issues, and since the shots are called under the standards of Townsend v. Sain, 127 state court rulings based on full and fair evidentiary hearings are routinely affirmed. 12s On the other hand, the possibility of some second guessing has certainly prdduced an increased sensitivity to constitutional rights on the part of state courts. 29 Third, we currently know too little about and do too little for prisoner education and deterrence to warrant firm judgments that liberal habeas corpus impairs those objectives. 30 It seems especially unlikely that the federal post-conviction remedy operates as a significant factor in view of the far greater number of state post-conviction petitions filed by most long term prisoners.
Finally, repose seems something less than "a psychological necessity," for so long as a person is kept in prison, the matter is final neither for him nor for the society that keeps-and supports-him there. 
L.Q. 68 (1966).
Professor Paul Freund has commented that filing habeas corpus petitions may actually have a positive therapeutic and educational effect on prisoners. Moreover, much of our crime is committed by the underprivileged and disadvantaged, those who find society cruel, unfair, and hypocritical. The concern for equal justice reflected in a system which does not forget such people but continues to attempt to rectify any injustice they may have suffered can also have a significantly deterrent and educational effect. On the other hand, rehabilitation is seriously hindered if a prisoner feels he has been the victim of inequitable treatment. See NEWmAN Professor Amsterdam stresses the administrative inconvenience and impaired reliability of a hearing or new trial many years after the event. 13 2 At first blush, considerations of impaired reliability seem important, but if one considers the fallibility of both the fact-finding and judgmental criminal processes, 1 3 3 and takes into account the waste of valuable human resources implicit in any penal system, the balance of social utility and overall reliability is far from clear.
Supporting, and perhaps underlying, the above finality considerations is a further concern: the fear of a legalized mass jail break by rapists, murderers, and other felons. 134 This fear is reflected in the concern expressed in Tehan about the possibility of unsuccessful retrials of all defendants who did not take the stand in six states, 135 and in Mr. Justice Clark's comment in Linkletter that prior police lawlessness would not be deterred "by the wholesale release of the guilty victims."1 3 6
The concern expressed in Tehan seems well-founded, 37 though a harmless error rule, which the Court is apparently considering for every adverse judgment of continuing significance, the fundamental difference between continuing imprisonment and other continuing effects needs no elaboration. This, of course, is one reason why res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus. The . . . characteristics of collateral litigation (which] may be denominated aspects of a "finality" factor . . . involve (a) duplication of judicial effort; (b) delay in setting the criminal proceeding at rest; (c) inconvenience and possibly danger in transporting a prisoner to the sentencing court for hearing; (d) postponed litigation of fact, hence litigaon n which will often be less reliable in producng the facts (i) respecting the post-conviction claim itself, and (ii) respecting the issue of gilt if the collateral attack succeeds in a form which allows retrial (the burden of proofit o n retrial, of course, remaining with the prosecutor). In combination, these finality considerations amount to a more or less persuasive argument against the cognizability of any particular collateral ciaim, the strength of the argument depending upon the nature of the claim, the manner of its treatment (if any) in the conviction proceedings, and the ircumstances under which collateral litigation must be had. The fallibility extends not only to the question of guilt of some crime, but also to the particular crime committed, and to the basis for and length of the sentence, ali of which are significant in determining the legality of the detention at the time habeas corpus relief is requested. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review Griffin, 13 8 might minimize problems. But insofar as the comment rule is concerned, the possibility of a legalized mass jail break would seem to be simply part of the price we must now pay for former failures to provide fair procedures, for here if anywhere the effect on the reliability of the guilt-determining process is clear. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that many prisoners would be released by the retroactive allowance of claims of illegal search and seizure. 39 An obvious yet sometimes overlooked aspect of the mass jail break concern also merits mention. Habeas corpus relief rarely means the thrusting onto society of menaces who otherwise would have been permanently incarcerated. Relatively few prisoners are in for life, 145 and even though habeas corpus relief is usually granted only to very serious offenders, 146 it still remains true that by the time all state and federal remedies and appeals have been exhausted, most prisoners have relatively little time left to serve. 47 In practice, habeas corpus often shortens a prisoner's detention minimally.
To summarize, some releases-often of serious offenders-would be inevitable under a policy of full retroactivity. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to indicate that the number of releases under such a policy would be so great as to justify the fears of mass jail break.
III. AN ALTERNATE THEoRY OF RETROACTIVITY

AND HABEAS CORPUS
Despite all that has been said above, some difficulties would surely result from the upsetting of old convictions. Why then should we apply new criminal procedure standards to release men who received trials in accordance with law as it was then understood, who are probably guilty at least of some offense, and whose guilt is no less certain now than then? Can we continue to reopen old cases in "a perpetual and unreasoned anxiety"' 4 8 to achieve perfect justice? Since this article is intended primarily as a critical comment on Professor Mishkin's reliability approach, a fully developed answer will not be presented. Nevertheless, the premises of such an answer will now be suggested.
The Nature of the Rights
Regardless of whether they affect reliability or personal dignity, newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights have one imment officials confirm the view that confessions are not as important as had been assumed, particularly in important cases, where thorough investigations by elite officers are made and other evidence is often obtained. According to some of these informants, the need for confessions is greatest in the numerous burglary and larceny cases, where elaborate investigations are uneconomical and where confederates are sought; others stress the importance of confessions in rape cases, in part because of the need for those things that are of the very essence 'of a scheme of ordered liberty'."' 151 Surely criminal due process principles are no less essential to "ordered liberty" merely because the trials in which they should have been applied occurred some years ago. Since newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights "are of the very essence of.. . 'ordered liberty,' " states should not be allowed to continue to deprive persons of their freedom on the basis of proceedings now considered contrary to "the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."' 152 The point can best be illustrated by brief examination of some newly declared rights. Thus, if the accusatorial system and the privilege against self-incrimination are indeed of the essence of our system of criminal justice,' 153 Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process to take the stand do any less damage to the privilege or to the reliability of the fact-finding process then than now? Has it not always been wrong to compel a man to incriminate himself, or to allow him, because of ignorance, to waive his rights either in the police station or in court? Has there even been a time when special handicaps imposed by poverty or race were not fundamentally wrong? Can a trial in which the defendant was deprived of the right of confrontation ever have been fair? Can our legal system ever allow the perpetuation of a conviction based on the kind of "conscience-shocking" conduct found in Rochin v. California? 5 8 If it is now said that defendants need a lawyer at every critical stage in the criminal process from interrogation to appeal, has this not always been true? After all, some of the principles of even so controversial a decision as Escobedo are reflected in the statutes of many states. 157 And even if Escobedo is to be read as requiring the presence of a lawyer from the moment of arrest, is it an especially novel thought that, as a matter of fairness, a man facing an adversary in a legal encounter affecting life and liberty should have the assistance of a lawyer at all critical moments? 158 The truth is, I think, that recent decisions have not discovered or created new rights; rather, they have only granted new federal remedies for old wrongs. These remedies have been granted only recently not because the rights they protect are newly conceived or newly relevant, but rather because concern for considerations of federalism has lessened 59 and perhaps because sensitivity to due process problems has increased. But the newness of the remedy does not eliminate the faults of the condemned proceeding, for just as we cannot tolerate the continued imprisonment of a man whose conviction was based on unreliable evidence, so we cannot tolerate the continued imprisonment of a man whose conviction failed in other respects to meet the fundamental legal standards of the community.
The "declaration" of new constitutional criminal procedure rights is thus an illustration of Professor Mishkin's comment in Part I of his article: "[E]ven when 'new law' must be made, it is often in fact a at 81. Similarly, in Palko the Court did not hold that the states could ignore double jeopardy considerations, but only that the particular statute allowing a state to appeal a criminal conviction was not in violation of principles of ordered liberty. It expressly reserved broader questions. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [Vol. 33:719 matter of the court articulating particular clear implications of values so generally shared in our society .. .that the process might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law."' 6 0 That the Court itself often views its innovating function from this perspective is evidenced by its persistent efforts to trace the historical roots of the rights it is "declaring."' 61 Moreover, there is an element of support for a broad theory of retroactivity in Mr. Justice Clark's intimation in Linkletter that, apart from unreliability, "the abhorrence of society" to coerced confessions is a reason for giving retroactive effect to coerced confession cases. 162 Since the "abhorrence" alluded to includes "so mild a whip" as was exercised in Haynes, it would appear clearly abhorrent to keep a man in jail when the process of his conviction violated other standards that are essential to ordered liberty.
The Linkletter holding cuts the other way, however, for the Court refused to apply Mapp retroactively on the ground that "the purpose" of Mapp's exclusionary rule was deterrence of police misconduct following the failure of other methods. 163 Mapp provides some support for the Linkletter. Court's interpretation and also contains language referring to a changed legal environment. 1 6 4 Mapp thus seems tied to current conditions. But these aspects represent only a part of Mapp. 165 Also present there is the notion of Justices Brandeis and 160 Mishkin 60. This comment was developed from some of Professor Lon Fuller's views.
161 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), is a particularly good example of both the Court's technique and the fundamental nature of the rights involved. There, the Court held that the sixth amendment's right of confrontation is binding on the states, and requires the exclusion of an out of court statement by a witness who was unavailable at trial. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that a "right of confrontation and ,cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is the country's constitutional goal." Id. at 405. Although Justices Harlan and Stewart rejected the majority's incorporation approach, they concurred in finding that "a right of confrontation is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. at 408.
The Court rejected prior decisions excluding this right, and relied on Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), and more recent cases for authority, stating that "there are few subjects upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief" in the fundamental nature of the right of confrontation. Id. at 405. The nature of the right and the language of the Court seem to compel application of Pointer to old trials as well as new, not because we require a higher level of confidence as to guilt, but because the level of confidence that was always required was not met. One court has given Pointer retroactive effect on habeas corpus. (1961) . The changed legal environment includes, the elimination of various ways of nullifying the exclusionary rule, such as the "silver platter" doctrine, overruled the term before in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
(1960).
165 For doubts about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, see Allen,
Holmes in Olmstead, 66 that "the government ought not to use evidence obtained . . . by a criminal act," 1 67 lest by such use the government ratify the illegality and become a lawbreaker. Through it has rarely been the sole basis for setting aside a conviction, 168 or excluding improperly obtained evidence, this notion has recurred enough in past cases' 69 to suggest that it reflects something quite fundamental: a link between exclusion and the rule of law.
This link can be illuminated by an analysis of the reasons for the Brandeis-Holmes notion. Traditional wisdom holds the reasons to be that: (1) government criminality breeds citizen criminality; 1 0 and (2) courts should not allow themselves to be contaminated with the fruits of "dirty business."' 171 Yet, these two reasons seem inadequate to explain today's exclusionary rule, which applies not only to clear and inexcusable abuses-which probably come before the courts today rarely, if ever-but also to good faith technical errors such as mistakes over probable cause, inadequate affidavits, and inadequately descriptive warrants. Such technical errors can hardly have any tendency to breed crime, nor are they such "dirty business" as will "contaminate" the courts in any meaningful sense.
172
The real reason for the Brandeis-Holmes notion seems to rest on a broad and fundamental principle: in a constitutional democracy of limited powers, a government agency has no authority over an individual except that which is conferred upon it by law; if such authority is exceeded, the fruits of such excess should not be recognized by any branch of government, especially that branch which has the supra note 139, at 32-34, 37-40. For empirical confirmation of some of these doubts, see 
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foremost role in furthering the rule of law. 173 The law sets limits to the state's exercise of power over the individual, and, 'regardless of mitigating circumstances, a substantial overstepping of those limits should not be legally cognizable. A court sworn to uphold and promote observance of the law cannot adequately perform its function if it ignores illegality in the enforcement of the law. This is not the place for an extended analysis or defense of the doctrine of "judicial integrity." That its requirements have been observed as often in the breach as in the performance is obvious. 1 74 Still, it was clearly an important element in Mapp, where relevant parts of the Olmstead dissent were quoted, 175 and the illegality occasioning its application to search and seizure was established as early as Wolf v. Colorado 76 in 1949. Consideration of the basic principles underlying Mapp and its exclusionary rule thus supports the view that all convictions in which illegally obtained evidence was admitted should be set aside.
To summarize, newly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights are not newly conceived or newly relevant. Rather, they reflect fundamental principles of our legal system-principles implicit in the concept of ordered, liberty. Regardless, then, of when it took place, a trial conducted in a manner inconsistent with these principles should not be permitted to stand.
Some Problems
Numerous objections to the above outlined theory may be raised: How does upsetting old convictions further the values of due process and the rule of law? Are all constitutional criminal procedure rights really fundamental? What about good faith state reliance on an overruled decision? Does not such a thoery both deny and discourage judicial creativity?
173 Indeed, it should not be legally cognizable by any governmental agency for any purpose, whether such purpose be tax collection, economic regulation, or law enforcement.
3t74 For example, a defendant will be held for trial even though he was brought into the jurisdiction illegally. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952 To turn first to judicial creativity, the arguments made in the preceding section do not imply that the Court has not been creative or has not been making "new law." The Court has made "new law"-and has done so quite openly and deliberately. But the new law the Court has been making is nothing more-or less-than the application to the states and the federal government of principles of legal morality fundamental to our particular constitutional democracy-the "natural law" of our society, if you will.
17 7 The judge who introduces such principles into the law is no less a creative judge, no less a "lawmaker," merely because he did not first conceive them. 1 8 Thus, the view proposed herein is not, I think, uncritical Blackstonianism.
On the other hand, would not complete retroactivity stifle such judicial creativity? Would not the Court be unwilling to declare some new rights if all new rights had to be declared retroactively? 179 This objection, if valid, is entitled to considerable weight, for too much still remains to be done. 8 0 There is reason to believe, however, that fears of stifling judicial creativity by complete retroactivity are exaggerated. In the past, when the unsettling effect was most certain and most significant-Gideon It is interesting that such concern is now being expressed by interests which would normally be expected to applaud judicial restraint. Indeed, the approval by prosecutors and their spokesmen of such a legislative device as prospective overruling seems somewhat inconsistent with the complaints by many of these that the Court has been legislating too much. 
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The University of Chicago Law Review induce state courts-and, perhaps, even local police forces-to try to anticipate future Supreme Court decisions in order to avoid large scale losses of convictions. 18 2 Non-retroactive overruling, by contrast, reduces some of this inducement. But how does the upsetting of old convictions further the purposes of recent constitutional criminal procedure decisions? More particularly, if Professor Mishkin's division of due process purposes into reliability and individual dignity categories is sound, how does retroactivity further those in the latter category? The answer is, I think, that upsetting old convictions promotes the purposes of dignity and integrity in the same way that upsetting new convictions does: in both instances, a community acting in accordance with its conception of the norms "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" refuses to accept the fruits of the violation of such norms. After all, how is any given defendant's dignity and integrity furthered by the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, of confessions obtained by coercion or in the absence of counsel, or of statements obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination? In all such applications of the exclusionary rule, the individual defendant's dignity and integrity have already been violated, and the subsequent use of the evidence in court would hardly be a significantly greater violation. Clearly, the protection of individual dignity and integrity in each application comes not from any deterrent effect, 8 3 but rather from the fact that state power over the individual is being confined to limits imposed by fundamental due process concepts. 8 4 Can it realistically be said, however, that all of the facets of all the rights recently imported into the due process clause are truly fundamental? Is it not true that although "some specifics of the Bill of Rights, in all their manifestations, may indeed be 'process' which is required by the conscience of mankind; others may not"?' s5 Are, for example, all of the twists and turns of federal search and seizure law, 183 Even Professor Mishkin eschews this viewpoint. See Mishkin 90 n.12 6 . I do not deny the great importance of deterrence as one basis for these rules, but it is not the only factor. Even if exclusion were not the best or even a good deterrent, convictions obtained by improper methods should still not be allowed to stand.
WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE
WPrr OF LmmRTY 86 (1960) . The short answer to these questions is that the Court evidently thinks so, for it has retained the language of Palko 8 ' 7 and has rejected almost all attempts to impose lesser standards on the states. 188 But short answers are not always good answers, especially where the questions are basic. Perhaps a fuller answer is that a policy of selective incorporation of only some aspects of due process rights would raise the same problem that Betts v. Brady' 89 did: the necessity of frequent decisions on hard issues, with the likelihood of wide differences of opinion over the proper choices to be made. Indeed, are there objective criteria for determining the fundamental nature of the various aspects of the right to counsel? Of the right to be free from an unannounced entry? Of the no comment rule? What are the factors that are clearly decisive as opposed to being merely relevant? 19 0 It seems to me easier and in the long run less abrasive simply to deem all facets of all constitutional rights fundamental. The detriment to state sovereignty resulting from the extension of federal protection to possibly marginal facets is more than compensated for by the benefits of greater certainty and reduced friction flowing from a policy of nondifferentiation among facets. 19 ' What about state reliance on overruled decisions, a consideration that clearly influenced the Court's actions in Linkletter, Griffin, and Tehan? All too often, state reliance does not merit protection. Unreasonable state searches and seizures were condemned as early as 1949 in Wolf, and any state reliance on the belief that misconduct would not be disciplined was unjustified. For years legislators, judges, prosecutors, and police ignored obvious problems of the availability of counsel, the coercion of confessions, the admission of self-incriminatory statements, and the special needs of indigent defendants: with respect at least to these areas, it can fairly be said that the Supreme Court gave the states time to put their own houses in order and that the states failed to do so. And in many cases, Escobedo being only one 
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example, the state's own laws were violated.
1 92 On such a record, it is difficult to see that state reliance merits protection.
Nor is it clear who would be harmed by complete retroactivity. State judges might be offended, but they certainly would not be harmed. Policemen and prosecutors have indeed prepared cases in reliance on prior law and thus overlooked or rejected evidence they might otherwise have used, 193 but they certainly would not become subject to criminal liability 19 4 or loss of personal reputation. States would, of course, lose some convictions, but, as has already been indicated, 195 the probable magnitude of this phenomenon is often exaggerated. And as for the time and expense of hearings and retrials which would be necessitated by a policy of complete retroactivity, suffice it to say that when the preservation of individual liberties has been at stake, the Supreme Court has rarely based its judgments on considerations of time and expense. 19 8 Still, is there not a need for stability and "predictability" in the law? Is it not true that "a holding of retroactivity would necessarily draw into question the value of... [the Supreme Court's] decisions as a guide for future conduct"? 1 7 This view, of course, conflicts with the earlier one, expressed by the very same voices, that complete retroactivity will stifle judicial creativity and discourage "the future development of progressive solutions to the difficult problems of criminal procedure"; 1 9 5 after all, such "development" will also "draw into question the value of... [the Supreme Court's] decisions as a guide for future conduct." This inconsistency perhaps confirms the earlier suggestion that no necessary connection exists between judicial creativity and retroactivity. In any event, the revolution in constitutional criminal procedure is not yet over, and instability and unpredictability will be with us for some time to come. Complete retroactivity is thus not likely to produce a significantly greater amount of doctrinal or [Vol. 33:719
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process other instability than will partial retroactivity under the reliability theory.
CONCLUSION
In response to Professor Mishkin's question, the reasons for upsetting old convictions on the basis of new constitutional doctrines come down to this: new constitutional doctrines are not new conceptions but rather reflections of principles of "ordered liberty" fundamental to our legal system. Such principles are equally applicable to past and present trials, for an ethical society cannot seek to retain the fruits of past defaults. This is not to deny that complete retroactivity involves many theoretical and practical difficulties. Many of the problems frequently linked to complete retroactivity seem to be, however, pseudo-problems, and the others seem fewer and less troublesome than those created by Professor Mishkin's theory. Complete retroactivity is at least consistent with the nature of newly declared constitutional rights, and it neither ignores the present role of habeas corpus nor creates gross inequities.
EPILOGUE
Long after this paper had been submitted for publication, the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Miranda v. Arizona 99 and Johnson v. New Jersey. 20 0 In the first, the Court went considerably beyond both Escobedo and the facts of the four cases before it and set down detailed guidelines designed to protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against the "compulsion inherent" in custodial interrogation. A week later the Court narrowly restricted the backward thrust of both Miranda and Escobedo: because it was not the "prime" or "basic" purpose of either case to improve the reliability of the factfinding process, the rulings were held applicable only to those cases in which the trials began after June 13, 1966, and June 20, 1964, the respective dates of the Miranda and Escobedo decisions.
The specific holding in neither case was very surprising. It was expected that the Court would reaffirm and expand Escobedo, and once Miranda was decided as a fifth amendment case, its purely prospective application was predictable. 201 That counsel is present when statements are taken from an individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court. The presence of an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, "all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."
223
In Johnson, the Court did stress that there are other reliability safeguards, particularly the continuing availability of the "increasingly meticulous" voluntariness standards. But one of the most important reasons for the decision in Miranda was that the secrecy of the interrogation room precluded a meaningful implementation of those voluntariness standards. 224 Moreover, the Court itself answered this point in Miranda when it declared that without "adequate warnings and the rights of counsel . . . 'all the careful safeguards . . . become empty formalities,' "225
B. Denial of Retroactivity to Cases on Direct Review
Probably the most novel aspect of Johnson was the Court's decision to limit the effect of Miranda and Escobedo to those cases in which trials began after the respective decisions, while leaving the LinkletterTehan direct review rule in effect for the latter situations. The Johnson choice of a trial date cut-off implicitly rejects Professor Mishkin's theoretical distinction between direct review and collateral attack as a basis for deciding retroactivity. However, while Professor Mishkin presented a carefully reasoned argument for his theory, applicable to all cases and based on a traditional and plausible distinction, the Court presented virtually no reasoned analysis for either the LinkletterTehan or Johnson dividing lines. As noted earlier, Linkletter and Tehan contained almost no justification for their particular cut-off points although the Johnson opinion explained that "decisions prior to . . . [those cases] had already established without discussion that
Mapp and Griffin applied to cases still on direct appeal at the time they were announced." 226 With respect to Escobedo and Miranda, the Court said only that it would be unfair to the authorities to impose the new rules on prior cases, for they had not had fair notice of such obligations prior to the decisions.
227
Although it is easy to criticize any cut-off point, the Court's choices in Johnson seem particularly arbitrary, especially in view of the different choices made in Linkletter and Tehan. Ironically, insofar as good faith reliance is concerned, the Court's rule in Johnson seems much more appropriate to the Griffin-Tehan situation. 228 The significant official conduct there was official comment during trial. In trials held before April 28, 1965, the date Griffin v. California was decided, there was every reason to believe such comment was appropriate, and if good faith reliance was to be protected, only comments in trials held after that date should have been "penalized." On the other hand, the most relevant official conduct in Escobedo and Miranda situations occurs during the pre-trial interrogation process and consistent protection of official reliance on prior law would require that Escobedo and Miranda not be applied to cases in which police conducted interrogations before the respective dates of those decisions, regardless of the trial dates. In short, if justified reliance by those state officers most directly affected is the controlling consideration, the particular cut-off dates chosen by the Court seem somewhat inappropriate. 229 226 86 Sup. Ct. at 1780. 227 Ibid. 228 In fact, as noted earlier, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), upset the only reliance which truly merited protection. See text accompanying note 192 supra. 229 For the contention that state officials' reliance should be ignored because such officers will not suffer any meaningful damage from retroactivity, see text accompanying notes 193-95 supra.
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The announced cut-off date also imposes serious inequities on defendants similarly placed, for it puts a premium on fortuities. For many, the availability of Miranda and Escobedo will ultimately depend on such frustratingly inconsequential matters as the congestion of trial dockets and attorneys' schedules; in some cases co-defendants whose trials were severed will receive radically different treatment. We undoubtedly will also face the prospect of mistrial motions by defendants who were on trial on June 13, 1966, and who thereby hope to bring their cases within the scope of the new rule. Undoubtedly the most pronounced inequity is caused by giving particular petitionerslike Escobedo and Miranda-the benefits of a new rule while withholding it from others whose cases were still on direct review when the rule was announced. 23 0 It was widely known that a decision elaborating Escobedo was imminent, most convicted defendants affected by that case appealed and raised the issue, and it was mere accident that Miranda, Vignera, Westover, and Stewart were fortunate enough to have their cases chosen by the Court. Indeed, on the same day Johnson was decided, the Court denied certiorari in over 120 cases raising issues similar to Miranda, many of which were on direct review. 23 1
With respect to cut-off dates for future innovating decisions, the Court's failure in Johnson to articulate any reason uniquely relevant to the choices made, indicates that it may generally adopt the trial date approach.
Cut-off dates are always harsh to some, but there is usually either a good reason for the date chosen or no good reason for a different date. Neither of these explains the Court's choice in Johnson. 
C. Retroactivity for Miranda and Escobedo
The main text of this article has already set forth most of the reasons why both Miranda and Escobedo should be given retroactive effect, but a few points may be worth adding.
With respect to Miranda, it should be noted that insofar as that decision sets out essential constitutional requirements, it is limited to a few matters: (1) the privilege applies in full to custodial interroga- tion; (2) a suspect must be apprised of the privilege; and (3) he must be given an unfettered opportunity to exercise it. The specific fourfold warning and counsel procedure set out by the Court is merely one type of protection and is not indispensable if the privilege can be shown to have been otherwise protected. 238 Thus, complete retroactivity for newly enunciated constitutional rights 234 would require retroactivity only for the principle that a knowing and free exercise of the privilege must be adequately protected and-by implicationthat any statement taken in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation must be shown to have resulted from a knowing and intelligent waiver.
This basic constitutional doctrine announced in Miranda is novel only insofar as it is now being effectively implemented for the first time. 235 As the Court was at pains to emphasize: (1) the privilege which the decision seeks to protect is and always has been considered to be essential to the operation of our accusatorial system and to ensuring respect for human dignity; 2 3 6 (2) it has deep historical roots, even with respect to custodial pretrial questioning, for its policies have been reflected in the state voluntariness cases and in such federal decisions as Bra& v. United States; 23 7 (3) the privilege must be protected in order to ensure a fair trial, and to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court; 238 (4) the privilege is seriously jeopardized by the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation, especially if the defendant is held incommunicado and not advised of his rights. 239 Since these rights are so fundamental and deep rooted, how can we, in justice, deny their full benefit to those whose trials antedated June 14, 1966? The injustice is aggravated by the high probability that in man3r cases these rights were in fact violated, as the Court's catalogue of police stratagems makes dear. Indeed, if the Court is correct in 233 86 Sup. Ct. at 1624. The defendant has the right to have a lawyer "during the interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. 
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asserting that unless protective devices are provided, no statement taken under the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings ... can truly be the product of free choice," there must be a presumption of compulsion for such protective devices were rarely provided. Finally, does it make sense to grant retroactivity to new voluntariness standards, which are explicitly intended to prevent encroachments on the privilege, while denying retroactivity to Miranda's constitutional core, which is aimed at precisely the same encroachments?
240
As for the retroactivity of Escobedo, courts may well be in some confusion as to exactly what it is that they are to apply to cases in which the trials began in the interim between Escobedo and Miranda. 'though the Court found that the "basic purpose" of Escobedo was to protect the fifth amendment privilege, it did nothing to dispel the uncertainty as to when Escobedo would be deemed violated. 241 More specifically, it failed to indicate how many of the five elements in the Escobedo holding were crucial to the decision. 242 For trials begun during the two years after Escobedo and before Miranda, it is thus uncertain, for example, whether the absence of a preliminary warning will suffice to nullify a confession by a defendant in custody.
243 240 The continuing availability of the "increasingly meticulous" voluntariness standards which, according to the Court, raise no issue of retroactivity, may draw some of the sting of Johnson, for it may well allow retroactivity to many claims which are not eligible for Miranda relief. The significant question is how much more stringent the voluntariness standards will become. They are never likely to reach the point where a defendant need only show either the absence of one of the four required warnings, or the lack of strong evidence of waiver, which is all that Miranda requires. But the Court may not be through refining voluntariness. In both Johnson and Davis v. North Carolina, 86 Sup. Ct. 1761 (1966), decided the same day, the Court stressed that the absence of some of the safeguards mandated by Miranda, such as advice about the privilege, or access to outside assistance, would be "a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made." 86 Sup. Ct. at 1764. If the conjunction of these two factors is sufficient to preclude a finding of voluntariness, then many prisoners-probably including 241 For some of the uncertainties, see authorities cited at note 76 supra and accompanying text.
242 "[T]he investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent .... " 378 U.S. at 490-91. 
D. A Concluding Comment
Johnson v. New Jersey seems to be an intensely practical decision by a Court which was attempting to forestall an overly-hostile public reaction to Miranda and* which was troubled by the possibility of a wholesale release of many guilty men. 244 But these considerations
should not have influenced the Court so decisively. The courts, the police, and the public would have learned to live with the effects of retroactivity, as they have done with so many other vociferously berated decisions. Moreover, the very arbitrariness of the particular cut-off dates chosen, coupled with the widely accepted belief that the decision was in fact based on practical considerations, 245 reinforces the appear-ance of the Court as a legislative chamber, with all the potential strains that such an appearance creates. When high principle is at stake, this appearance is worth risking. However, it is much less acceptable when no such principle is involved and the result only compounds inequity.
